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This paper studies empirically the effects of political institutions in economic growth. Using dynamic panel estimation, 
we studied how political institutions affect the economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic 
development.  It  presents  new  empirical  results  showing  that  the  political  institutions  work  as  a  substitute  of 
democracy in promotion of economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important to increase economic 
growth only when democracy is not consolidated, and, at the other hand, it cannot affect growth in the countries with 
consolidated democracies. We found also that poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization have a different rule 
of political institutions on growth. 
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Resumo 
Este  artigo  investiga  empiricamente  os  efeitos  das  instituições  políticas  no  crescimento  economic.  Utilizando 
métodos  de  painel  dinâmico,  nós  estudamos  como  as  intituições  políticas  afetam  o  crescimento  em  diferentes 
estágios da democracia e do desenvolvimento econômico. Novos resultados empíricos são apresentados mostrando 
que  as  intituições  políticas  trabalham  como  um  substituto  para  a  democracia  na  promoção  do  crescimento 
econômcio. Em outras palavras, instituições plolíticas são importantes para aumentar o crescimento apenas em 
democracias  não  consolidadas,  e,  por  outro  lado,  não  afetam  o  crescimento  em  países  com  democracias 
consolidadas. Nós obtivemos ainda que países pobres com alta fracionalização étnica apresentam uma combinação 
diferente de instituições políticas para a promoção do crescimento. 
Palavras-Chave: Crescimento Econômico, Instituições Políticas. 
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1.  Introduction 
To access the role of political institutions on economic performance is not a trivial task. 
The huge variation of institutional features and economic outcomes in the world today is the 
result of long-run historical and social processes in each particular society. Different institutions 
can do the same and, at the same time, similar institutional settings can economically perform 
very differently. What can account for this variation? Why are some democracies prosperous 
but not others? What is the effect of political institutions on economic performance?  
Economists have already demonstrated that economic institutions are the major source 
of  economic  growth  across  countries.  Among  other  things,  economic  institutions  have  a 
decisive  influence  on  investments  in  physical  and  human  capital,  technology,  and  the 
organization of the production. It is also well recognized that in addition to have a decisive role 
on economic growth, economic institutions are also important for the distribution of resources 
available in a society. As a consequence, some groups or individuals will be able to extract more 
benefits  than  others  given  the  set  of  the  preexisting  economic  conditions  and  resource 
allocation.  In  other  words,  economic  institutions  are  endogenous  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson 
2006) and they reflect a continuous conflict of interests among various groups and individuals 
over the choice of economic institutions and the distribution of resources.  
The institutional design of economic institutions that prevails depends thus mostly on 
the allocation of political power among elite groups. Whatever political group concentrates 
more political power, the set of economic institutions will tend to exhibit the preferences that 
please  powerful  players  and  not  necessarily  the  aggregated  welfare  in  a  society.  Although 
economic institutions determine economic performance, the way political power is allocated 
determines economic institutions. In other words, economic institutions are chosen because 
they serve the interests of politicians or social groups that hold political power at the expense 
of the rest. Put even more strongly: this is why powerful groups do not  predate efficiently 
(Acemoglu, 2002).  
Powerful political players do not behave favoring economic welfare because they face 
commitment problems intrinsic to the use of political power. In addition, powerful political 
players usually cannot credibly commit that they will adequately compensate potential losses 
as a consequence of a particular set of economic institutions chosen by them (Weingast 1995). 
That  is  why  economic  policy  tends  to  be  inefficient  and  sometimes  generate  poverty  and 
inequality. Acemoglu and Johnson (2000) argue that “the more fundamental barriers to the 
adoption of better technologies, and more generally to economic development, are not groups 
whose economic rents are threatened by progress, but groups whose political power is on the 
line.” In that perspective, the distribution of political power is also endogenous and will be a 
direct consequence of political institutions.  
Political  institutions,  formal  and  informal  rules,  determine  thus  the  constraints  and 
incentives  faced  by  key  players  in  a  society.  Given  the  endogenous  feature  of  political 3 
 
institutions and strategic allocation of powers they engender, appropriately chosen institutions 
can help the development of credible mechanisms capable of decreasing risks of opportunistic 
behavior of political and economic players. North and Weingast (1989), for instance, analyzing 
the  institutional  conditions  for  the  economic  development  of  England  in  the  seventeenth 
century, claim that “the ability of a government to commit to private rights and exchange is 
thus an essential condition for growth.” In addition to credibly commit a state to market against 
opportunistic behaviors, political institutions have also to be self-enforcing. In other words, 
political institutions have to provide incentives for politicians to abide them in sustainable way 
overtime.  
As  good  economic  performance  as  a  function  of  credible  inter-temporal  and  self-
enforcing  commitments  can  be  established  in  a  great  variety  of  combination  of  political 
institutional, the task of making causal relation among them is not easy. Thus, the key research 
questions this research note tries to address are the following: what form or combination of 
political institutions is required to enhance economic growth? Do political institutions affect 
economic  performance  regardless  any  precondition  or  stage  of  economic  development?  In 
other words, does a consolidated or incipient democracy tend to perform similarly if they have 
the parallel or different political institutions? 
To assess the importance of political institutions on economic growth we developed an 
econometric model which takes into account several political institutions such as electoral rules 
(plurality rule vs. proportional representation - open and closed-lists - and district magnitude); 
form of government (parliamentary vs. presidential systems); political regime (dictatorship vs. 
democracy measured in terms of years under democracy); government fractionalization; size of 
the executive’s political party or coalition in Congress (number of seats held by executive’s 
party  or  coalition);  federalism  and  robustness  of  federal  structure  (degree  to  which 
states/provinces have authority over taxing, spending or regulating); and years that the same 
elite group is in office or government durability. Our key dependent variable was the Growth 
Domestic  Product  –  GDP  per  capita.  Controlling  for  other  economic  variables,  our  findings 
indicate that political institutions fundamentally matter for the incipient democracies only, but 
not for consolidated democracies. 
This research note is organized as follows: in the next session we will develop a critical 
dialogue with the literature about the effect of political institutions on economic performance. 
Next we discuss our variables and present our econometric model followed by our main results. 
Finally  we  present  a  brief  conclusion  highlighting  the  implications  of  our  findings  to  the 
pertinent literature. 
 
2.  Political Institutions and Economic Growth 
Before approaching those questions empirically, it is necessary to discuss the political 
institutions  we  are  talking  about  here  and  their  connections  with  economic  growth.  A 4 
 
substantial  body  of  research  has  established  a  link  between  economic  outcomes  and  the 
institutional configuration of a nation. Regardless if a country has or not a written document, 
constitution usually defines the set of institutional endowments that governs its policymaking 
process, especially among alternatives of political and economic systems. Constitutions, for 
instance,  define  if  a  country  is  governed  by  a  system  of  separation  of  powers  between 
governing branches or if it shares power between the parliament and the cabinet; it specifies 
the electoral system which is calibrated to produce a proliferation of minority parties or a 
smaller  set  of  parties  with  disciplined  authority  over  legislators;  the  amount  of  legislative 
powers held by legislators and the amount delegated to the executive; the extent to which the 
judiciary is independent; if the country is organized with a number of federal autonomous sub-




All  electoral  system  entails  a  trade-off  between  governability  and  representation. 
Compared  to  proportional  representation,  plurality  rule  in  single-member  districts  provide 
incentives  for  majority  single-party  government  and,  as  a  consequence,  more  governability 
power. At the same time, it makes politicians to be more responsive to narrow constituencies 
which expect to receive in return target benefits. Usually these targeting benefits come at the 
expense of broad national policies that usually benefit broader population. 
To determine whether electoral institutions influence economic performance, scholars 
have analyzed the extent to which electoral rules provide incentives to favor special interests or 
if electoral rules benefit large segments of the population. It is generally assumed that this 
decision is mostly a function on whether electoral institutions give candidates incentives to 
develop personal constituencies or base their career on collective party’s records.  
Cox (1997), for instance, shows that poor countries (those with GDP per capita income 
less than $6900) tend to use plurality systems. Person and Tabellini (2000 and 2006), predict 
that political rents (corruption) will be higher under electoral systems that rely on list voting 
than in systems where voters directly select individual candidates. They also claim that open list 
systems (voters can modify the party’s order of candidates) should be more conducive to good 
behavior than closed lists (pre-determined list by party leaders which is non-amendable by 
voters), as should preferential voting (voters are asked to rank candidates of the same party). 
These authors also found that the ballot structure is strongly correlated with corruption: “a 
switch  from  a  system  with  all  legislators  elected  on  party  lists,  to  plurality  rule  with  all 
legislators individually elected, would reduce perceptions of corruption by as much as 20 per 
cent (…) The decline in corruption is stronger when individual voting is implemented by plurality 
rule, rather than by using preferential voting or open list in proportional electoral systems.” 5 
 
By  making  a  distinction  between  inter-party  and  intra-party  competition,  Carey  and 
Shugart (1995) and Golden and Chang (2001) claim that the former type of competition  is 
desirable, but the latter form of competition leads politicians to please local constituencies 
through patronage and other illegal side-payments. Kurnicova and Ackerman (2002) claim that 
closed-list proportional with representation is more conducive to corruption. Golden and Chang 
(2001), on the other hand, show that open-list leads to more corruption than closed-list. Thus, 
while individual accountability under plurality rule seems to strength good behavior, the effect 
of closed versus open rules is still controversial. However, Person and Tabeline (2000) show 
that when the electoral race have likely winners incentives for good behavior may instead be 
weaker  under  plurality  than  proportional  representation.  The  winner-take-all  rules  in 
majoritarian  systems  forces  competing  parties  to  focus  exclusively  on  the  swing  voting 
constituencies leading them to promise fewer public goods and more targeting goods. Although 
Milesi-Ferretti  et  al.  (2001)  share  the  same  finding  they  predict  an  ambiguous  relationship 
between electoral rules and government spending. As we can see, the findings so far are not 
conclusive with very opposing interpretations about the effect of electoral institutions. In fact, 
the literature has not directly addressed the relationship between electoral institutions and 
economic performance, but just indirectly via accountability mechanisms, corruption, and rent-
seeking.  
 
Single Party versus Coalition Government/Unified versus Divided Government 
In general terms, the “electoral institutionalists,” as they are called by Hallerberg and 
Von  Hagen  (1997),  argue  that  coalition  governments  are  associated  with  larger  costs  than 
single-party governments (Poterba, 1994) and that power dispersion increases the chances of 
fiscal profligacy. In this respect, Roubini and Sachs (1989: 905), for instance, argue that “when 
power is dispersed, either across branches of the government (as in the US), or across many 
political parties through the alteration of political control over time, the likelihood of inefficient 
budgetary policy is heightened. Thus they find that the size and persistence of budget deficits in 
industrial countries in the past decade is greatest where there have been divided government 
(e.g. multi-party coalitions rather than majority-party government).”  
Other scholars argue that expenditures grow as the number of legislators and political 
parties increase, and that the budget approved by a coalition is larger than the expected budget 
supported by a single-party majority (Weingast 1979; Shepsle, Weingast, and Johnsen 1981). In 
multiparty legislatures, as the effective number of parties increases, coalitions become unstable 
and, because the norm of universalism, the size of the budget grows (Scartascine and Crain, 
2001). Electoral systems with proportional  representation combined with large districts are 
more  likely  to  produce  weaker  governments  than  plurality  rule  systems  (Stein,  Talvi,  and 
Grisanti, 1998). This position is shared by Hallerberg and Marier (2004) who point out that “the 
level  of  the  Common  Pool  Resource  problem  in  the  legislature  depends  upon  the  type  of 6 
 
electoral system. If states have open-list proportional representation systems, then increases in 
district magnitude increase the problem, while under closed lists increases in district magnitude 
decrease the problem.” Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) also claim  that coalition governments 
face greater difficulties on implementing fiscal adjustments as well as on responding to budget 
unbalance than unitary governments. Acosta and Coppedge (2001), in a more extensive study 
on  Latin  American  countries,  claim  that  the  presidents’  partisan  powers  have  a  direct  and 
powerful  effect  on  spending  and  only  an  indirect  effect  on  deficits  per  se.  That  is,  “Latin 
American Presidents who wished to restrain spending in the 1980s and 1990s achieved this goal 
to the extent that they could depend on extensive, disciplined support in Congress. However, 
these same institutions also helped other presidents accelerate spending if that was their goal.” 
  
Elections and Accountability 
Under single-party government voters can better identify who should be blamed or 
rewarded for the observable economic performance. Under coalition government, however, 
voters may face difficulties identifying who to blame amongst coalition partners for the bad 
performance.  Benhabib  and  Przeworski  (2006)  claim  that  institutions  that  matter  for 
development  are  those  that  make  rulers  accountable.  Such  institutions  should  induce 
governments  to  limit  rent  extraction  and  to  promote  growth.  Indeed,  in  the  light  of  our 
analysis, these institutions are fundamental for development. They suggest that accountability 
can be enforced through two distinct mechanisms. Governments are politically accountable 
when they are subject to sanctions by citizens, that is, if voters can remove incumbents from 
office when they extract rents in excess of the amount voters see as justified. Whenever they 
are both present, the two accountability mechanisms operate in combination.  
 
Parliamentary versus Presidential system 
Presidential  and  parliamentary  systems  incorporate  different  classes  of  institutional 
arrangements. These arrangements govern the assignment of veto and agenda-setting power 
and  the  control  of  the  executive  and  legislature  over  each  other’s  electoral  destinies  and 
survival. There used to be a lively debate about whether presidential systems are less stable or 
more susceptible to gridlock, which is not the focus of the argument here. For contributions to 
this debate, see Linz and Valenzuela (1994), who argue against presidentialism, and Mainwaring 
and Shugart (1997), who suggest that the vast differences in the electoral rules and level of 
party  discipline  among  presidential  systems  make  sharp  conclusions  about  the  effects  of 
presidentialism on stability, gridlock, and capricious decision making more difficult. Cheibub 
and Limongi (2000) argue as well that political instability need not be correlated with political 
system.  They  find  that  a  core  assumption—that  majority  control  of  both  executive  and 
legislature  makes  parliamentary  systems  more  stable—frequently  fails  to  hold;  22%  of 
parliamentary regimes they examine have minority governments. Mainwaring (1993) argues 7 
 
that the problem with presidential system occurs when it is combined with multiparty systems. 
He  claims  that  “in  presidential  systems,  multipartism  increases  the  likelihood  of 
executive/legislative deadlocks and immobilism. It also increases the likelihood of ideological 
polarization.  Finally,  with  multipartism,  presidents  need  to  build  interplay  coalition  to  get 
measures through the legislature, but interplay coalition building in presidential system is more 
difficult and less stable than in parliamentary systems” (pp. 202). 
 
Federalism 
Other research, notably which associated with Weingast, (see for example, 1995) links 
economic outcomes to federalism. Weingast links the economic rises of England and the United 
States, as well as the recent boom in China, to federalism. Federalism provides a way of limiting 
a government that is strong enough to protect private markets, but also powerful enough to 
“confiscate  the  wealth  of  its  citizens”  (1995,  24).  This  is  because  competition  among  sub-
national governments provides incentives to create economic prosperity, rather than intervene 
in markets, pander to interest groups, or act corruptly; because of federalism, sub-national 
governments are unlikely to abuse the authority vested in them by the citizenry. Sub-national 
governments  are  also  better-suited  for  creating  policies  well-adjusted  to  local  conditions 
(Weingast 2006). 
Weingast is particularly interested in a specific form of federal systems what he calls 
“market-preserving  federalism.”  In  addition  to  have  hierarchy  and  autonomy  (minimal  or 
necessary conditions for federalism), a system to be a market-preserving requires three other 
features which makes federalism self-sustainable: sub-national unites have regulatory powers 
over the economy; no trade barriers against other political unities of the federation; and federal 
unities  nave  neither  the  ability  to  print  money  nor  unlimited  credit  (Weingast  2006:  4). 
Empowered  with  these  institutional  features,  sub-national  unities  limit  the  central 
government’s authority to make economic policies. In addition, market-preserving federalism 
has the effect of inducing competition among lower unities of the federal structure, diversity of 
public goods and, as a consequence, limits the success of rent-seeking. 
However, in a more recent paper, Weingast (2006) analysis why economic performance 
differ across federalisms? Some of them are reach (Switzerland and United States) while some 
are poor (Argentina and Brazil); yet others exhibit fast-paced growth (modern China) which 
others little growth (Mexico). In other to deal with this puzzle he relies on what he calls “second 
generation of fiscal federalism” which has a positive approach to this decentralized system 
rather than the normative view of the first generation. This second generation emphasizes the 
importance of incentives generated by local tax and for the design of transfer systems so that 
equalization  goals  can  be  achieved  without  diminishing  the  incentives  of  public  officials  to 
foster local economies. Weingast (2006: 9) claims that “market-preserving federalism limits the 
exercise of corruption, predation, and rent-seeking by all levels of government.” 8 
 
 
3.  Methodology and Data 
A significant number of papers have recently studied how economic policies, or their 
resulting performances, have been affected by the structure of political institutions. Specifically, 
those articles make use of post-war data to evaluate how growth or other measurements of 
economic performance are affected using dynamic panel methods such as the difference-in-
difference methodology (e.g. Acemoglu et al (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2006), Giavazzi and 
Tabellini  (2005),  Persson  (2005),  Papaioannou  and  Siourounis  (2004),  Rodrik  and  Wacziarg 
(2004). 
There is no question as to the dynamic panel methodology, given that this is indeed the 
most suitable method for the study in question. However, Bond et al (2001) have shown that, in 
studies of economic growth, first-differenced GMM estimator can be poorly behaved, since 
lagged levels of the series provide only weak instruments for subsequent first differences and 
showed that this problem may be substantial in practice. To solve this problem they suggest 
using a system-GMM estimator that exploits stationarity restrictions. It has been proved that 
this  approach  generates  more  reasonable  results  than  first-differenced  GMM  in  empirical 
growth models. 
The used specification follows the inclusion of  regulators necessary for the study of 
economic growth (see Durlauf et. al., 2005), given by 
 
  it it it it it u x p g g          
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where  it g  is the per capita economic growth rate (GROWTH) of country  i in period  t. The 
lagged  value  of  this  variable  on  the  right-hand  side  is  included  to  capture  persistence  in 
economic  growth  and  also  potentially  mean-reverting  dynamics  (i.e.,  the  tendency  of  the 
economic growth to return to some equilibrium value for the country). The main variable of 
interest is  1  it p , the lagged value of the political variables defined in the section before. The 
parameter   therefore measures the causal effect of political variables on economic growth. All 
other potential covariates are included in the vector  1  it x . In this vector we included the first 
difference of human capital stock (average years of schooling - HUMAN), lagged levels of per 
capita GNP and investment (INV). All data of economic variables were obtained from Barro and 
Lee (2004)
1 and Penn World Table 6.2.  it u  is an error term, capturing all other omitted factors, 
with  0 ) (  it u E  for all  i and  t. Finally, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the World 
Bank, compiled by Beck et al (2001) and updated in 2004, contains all the political variables 
employed  in  the  analysis.  Appendix  Table  A.1  summarizes  definitions  and  sources  of  the 
                                                             
1 The Barro-Lee database supplies a five-year based database. We used a linear interpolation to adjust these data. 9 
 
political variables we use in the paper.
2 We use yearly data on a large sample of 109 countries
3 
covering a maximum time span from 1975 to 2004. 
 
4.   Full Sample Results 
Political  institutions  place  constraints  and  incentives  on  key  societal  players  within 
nations. The government’s ability to commit to private rights and exchange is an essential 
condition  for  economic  growth.  Thus,  to  generate  positive  economic  outcomes,  political 
institutions must provide incentives for politicians to create favorable economic policies, in the 
short-run  and  into  the  future;  good  economic  performance  is  a  function  of  credible  inter-
temporal commitments of policy makers generated by political institutions. 
 
 
Table 1 shows the results for the entire sample of countries. Each column represents the 
result  of  the  estimation  taking  into  consideration  the  effect  of  one  aspect  of  the  political 
institutions. The economic growth is the dependent variable and line  i p  shows the marginal 
effects of each political variable on the economic growth. The results of the control variables 
with the correct sign are significant in all the cases for the explanation of economic growth. 
The initial results show that a parliamentary (SYSTEM) and stable (YRSOFFC) regime, 
with  the  chief  executive  remaining  for  a  long  time  in  power  results  in  good  economic 
performance.  Persson,  Roland,  and  Tabellini  (2000)  note  that,  as  compared  to  presidential 
systems,  cohesion  is  higher  both  across  branches  of  government  and  across  actors  in  the 
legislature  in  parliamentary  systems.  Unlike  presidential  governments,  majorities  in 
parliamentary systems are subject to no-confidence motions, which bring about a loss of power 
                                                             
2
We also refer the reader to the original source book of the DPI database for more information on the variables. It can be found at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004_variable-definitions.pdf  
3 The list of countries is in Appendix Table A.2 
Table 1: Effects of Political Variables on Economic Growth – ALL COUNTRIES 
 
Variables  i p  
SYSTEM  YRSOFFC  GOVFRAC  ENPG  GOVUNI  MDMH  PLURALITY  CL  POLARIZ  AUTHOR  STATE 















































































































OBS: t-statistics in parentheses. * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.10 10 
 
for the ruling parties. Therefore, because ruling parties are weary of no-confidence motions, 
stable and cohesive majorities are more likely to form in parliamentary systems. This cohesion 
of parliamentary systems is found to be associated with growth-promoting economic policies 
(Persson 2005). 
The  results  concerning  the  variables  that  measure  the  degree  of  government 
fragmentation with regard to the number of parties (GOVFRAC, ENPG, POLARIZ, and GOVUNI) 
present contradictory results though. Following from the above theory, it is expected that any 
given  nation  should  experience  higher  economic  growth  when  its  legislature  is  cohesive, 
whether  it  be  parliamentary  or  presidential.  If  coordination  problems  within  and  across 
government branches can be overcome, the quality of economic policies is likely to increase. 
Moreover, if governments are instable, economic growth is likely to be reduced, though the 
cause of this instability may arise from opportunistic behavior on the part of the government. 
Therefore, we should expect that the greater the government fractionalization, polarization, 
and the greater the number of partisan veto players within the government’s coalition the 
smaller the economic growth. However, the positive and statistically significant coefficients of 
these variables suggest exactly the opposite. This odd result can be better understood when we 
differentiate the sample between democratic and autocratic governments as we did in the next 
econometric exercise. With regard to the variable GOVUNI, that measures the percentage of 
government seats in Congress, it behaved according to the theoretical expectation. That is, 
minority governments are likely to be associated with less economic growth than coalition and 
single-party majority governments.  
The results related to the variables that represent electoral rules (MDMH, PLURALITY 
and  CL)  are  consistent  with  the  literature  expectation.  That  is,  the  greater  the  district 
magnitude, the less proportional the electoral system is, and the more control party bosses 
have on party members’ nomination the higher the economic growth. Thus, if the electoral 
system creates incentives for politician’s personal reputation instead of partisan and collective 
reputation, economic performance suffers.  
With  regard  to  our  two  variables  that  measure  federalism  both  of  them  behaved 
according to the literature’s prediction on market-preserving federalism. That is, countries that 
are  hierarchically  autonomous  and  decentralize  authority  regulatory  to  sub-national  unities 
lead to better economic performance. 
 
5.  Democracy and Economic Growth 
Table 2 shows the results of the effects of the political variables and democracy on the 
economic growth. Given that the dummy variable DEM assumes value 1 for democracies and 
zero for authoritarian regimes, the interaction between the political variables and DEM inform 
us if the marginal effect of the political institutions is significantly different when democracies 11 
 
and autocracies are compared. The results show that the effects of the political variables are 
different for all the cases, except for the ENPG, MDMH and CL. 
 
 
In all the significant cases the interaction had opposite sign in relation to the political 
variable without interaction. That is, in a democratic regime the magnitude of the marginal 
effect of such variables on economic growth is smaller or changes the sign. Given that political 
variables  often  suggest  a  certain  degree  of  political  rights,  the  results  suggest  that  even 
autocratic regimes can have a satisfactory economic performance, as long as some political 
rights are granted to society. In other words, autocracies can differentiate from one another in 
terms  of  political  institutions.  That  is  why  several  studies  have  not  found  considerable 
differences between the economic growth of democracies and/or autocracies (Przeworski at all 
2000). Therefore, instead of considering the different types of regimes as a single “package,”  it 
is imperative to determine which type of democracy and/or autocracy are considered within 
the analysis.  
The line  i p  represents the effect of the political variables in authoritarian regimes and 
the sum of the coefficients  i p and DEM* i p  tells us which is the marginal effect of the political 
variables in democratic regimes. The last line of Table 2 tells us if the sum of the coefficients  i p
and DEM* i p  is significantly different from zero. 
The results show that the effects of the political variables are different for autocracies 
and democracies. In addition, the change of sign of the YRSOFFC and POLARIZ variables has 
called our attention. The YRSOFFC variable reveals that, in democratic regimes, the longer the 
Table 2: Effects of Political Variables and Democracy on Economic Growth 
 
Variables  i p  
SYSTEM  YRSOFFC  GOVFRAC  ENPG  GOVUNI  MDMH  PLURALITY  CL  POLARIZ  AUTHOR  STATE 




























































































































































Wald Test  42.23*  5.40*  4.11*  2.27  0.01  0.16  31.86*  11.68*  8.71*  59.10*  85.98* 
OBS: t-statistics in parentheses. * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.10 12 
 
political power is held by a particular political leader the greater the economic growth. That can 
be explained by the long-term political gains. That is, the chief executive only appropriate from 
political gains if there is a real expectation as to the control of power in the long-run. Therefore, 
it is fair to expect that countries with high YRSOFFC have better long-run policies. However, 
when dealing with autocracies such effect is perverse. That is, in an autocratic regime the 
YRSOFFC variable can signify less political freedom, property rights, and freedom of expression 
– in sum, it implies less effective policies and fewer investments.  
Political  polarization  (POLARIZ)  also  has  opposing  effect  under  democracy  and 
authoritarian regimes. While this variable does not help authoritarian governments to achieve 
good economic performance it does provide a positive impact on democratic governments. 
That is, authoritarian regimes require political cohesion and internal coordination in order to 
afford  economic  growth.  However,  democracy  deals  much  better  with  ideological  diversity 
between the governing and other political parties. 
Other interesting findings that deserve to be highlighted is that the variables “effective 
number of parties in the government coalition,” “District Magnitude,” and the “closed list” 
electoral  system  lose  statistical  significance  under  democracy.  We  do  not  have  a  clear-cut 
explanation why those political variables are statistically significant under authoritarian regime 
but not under democracy.   
 
6.  Results for Selected Samples 
In addition to the different effects on the democratic and autocratic regimes, it might be 
possible to see differences among the political variables when poor countries with high levels of 
ethnic fractionalization are taken into consideration. This is a contradictory issue in the current 
literature. Kaplan (2000) argues that democratic transitions are risky for low-income countries 
with poor institutions and ethnic divisions, while Rodrik and Waczirag (2005) reach the opposite 
result. If democratization may have different effects on those countries, the structure of the 
political institutions probably have different effects on the economic growth of such countries 
too. 
Furthermore, another relevant question is the age of democracy. Given that in non-
democratic  countries  political  institutions  work  as  substitutes  for  democracy  in  order  to 
generate growth, it is worth questioning what happens when democracy is firmly established. 
Does democracy also replace political institutions minimizing their effects on the economy? 
To explore such issue the model was estimated for the following sub-samples: i-) Sub-
Saharan African countries; ii-) Rich countries; iii-) Poor countries; and iv-) Old democracies. The 
group of “Rich countries” includes countries with average GDP per capita greater than the total 
average;  and  “Poor  countries”  are  those  with  an  average  GDP  per  capita  lower  than  the 
average.  The  sub-sample  “old  democracies”  includes  countries  which  have  been  under  a 13 
 
democratic government during the entire period and have had at least 25 years of a democratic 
system at the begging of the sample. 
Table  3  shows  the  results  of  the  effects  of  political  institutions  only.  The  control 
variables used are the same as before, but the results are omitted for ease of reading. The full 
models are available upon request though.   
 
 
The  results  show  that  in  countries  with  a  consolidated  democracy  the  political 
institutions (with the exception of the variable “number of years the chief executive has been in 
power”)  do  not  significantly  affect  the  economic  growth.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis  that 
democracy  and  political  institutions  are  substitutes  for  determining  economic  growth  is 
accurate. Political institutions matter mostly in incipient democracies than consolidated ones. 
New democracies need the effective and ostensive presence of political institutions. Old and 
consolidated democracies, on the other hand, have already internalized the effect of those 
institutions. As a consequence their impact on economic performance is less visible and not as 
much of necessary.  
As expected, in rich countries the effects of the political institutions on the growth are 
small or insignificant as oppose to poor countries. This finding support the results for “Old 
democracies” since there are a strong correlation between income and democracy. The result 
also makes clear that political institutions have a different effect on countries with significant 
ethnic fractionalization. Moreover, it is clear that a regime with fragmented control of power - 
which  generate  higher  values  of  GOVFRAC  and  ENPG  -  or  with  power  distribution  among 
districts or states acts in opposition to growth. In those countries, such fact can be explained by 
Table 3: Effects of Political Variables on Economic Growth – Selected Samples 
 
Samples  i p  
SYSTEM  YRSOFFC  GOVFRAC  ENPG  GOVUNI  MDMH  PLURALITY  CL  POLARIZ  AUTHOR  STATE 




































































































                       
OBS: t-statistics in parentheses. * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.10 14 
 
the high costs involved in the making process of political alliances for the implementation of 




7.  The Rule of Political Institutions on Economic Growth around Democratizations 
A relevant result of this work is the change in magnitude and sign when there is a 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system. The main question we should 
analyze  is  if  political  institutions  modify  the  economic  performance  during  the  period  of 
democratization. For such analysis we follow Rodrik and Waczirag´s approach (2005). We first 
defined a dummy variable: New Democracy – ND. This variable takes the value of 1 in the 
year(s) and subsequent five years of any major democratization (as defined by Polity IV, 2002). 
Using  the  ND  variable  we  can  determine  if  the  country’s  economic  growth  during  the 
democratization period were depended on political institutions. 
Table  4  shows  the  respective  results.  The  interaction  between  ND  and  the  political 
variables (outlined in the line ND* i p ) tell us if during the democratization period the economic 
growth was different in relation to the political institutions. The last two lines of Table 4 shows 
the results of Wald’s tests - they reveal the significance of the marginal effect of the political 
Table 4: Effects of Political Variables on Economic Growth after Democratizations 
 
Variables  i p  
SYSTEM  YRSOFFC  GOVFRAC  ENPG  GOVUNI  MDMH  PLURALITY  CL  POLARIZ  AUTHOR  STATE 









































































































































































































Wald Tests                       
(A)+(B)  16.36*  0.56  2.06  0.24  0.74  0.42  36.41*  26.61*  3.13**  8.10*  34.20* 
(A)+(B)+(C)  45.82*  70.88*  3.39**  16.46*  2.89**  0.007  21.67*  5.82*  1.29  22.09*  110.93* 
OBS: t-statistics in parentheses. * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.10 15 
 
variables  during  periods  of  democratization.  This  significance  is  given  by  the  sum  of  the 
coefficients i p , DEM* i p , and ND* i p  (in line A+B+C). 
The results indicate that political institutions affect the economic outcome during the 
process of democratization. Such relationship may explain the great heterogeneity among the 
economic performances of the countries during the post-democratization period as addressed 
by Rodrik and Waczirag (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2007). Such result sustains similar 
conclusions obtained by Inman and Rubinfeld (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006) and it 
presents a mechanism capable of diminishing the waiting time for the economic gains resultant 
from democracy. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005) argue that a democratic system will only 
have economic gains  in the long-run. This work has concluded that economic gains can  be 
favorable even in the short-run as long as the political institutions provide for conditions that 
can diminish the momentary instability. 
Additionally, the results related to the political institutions after the democratization 
process are less relevant than during the period of democratization. Such fact sustains the idea 
that the consolidation of democracy diminishes the importance of the political institutions in 
relation  to  the  economic  performance  due  an  existing  substitutability  among  them.  Once 
democracy is consolidated, and favorable institutional conditions for investments are provided, 
the importance of the political variable loses intensity. 
 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
In sum, the relationship between political institutions and economic growth is quite 
significant. The  importance of such  relationship varies drastically in relation to the  level of 
democratization and the stage of the economic development of each country. This work sought 
to shed light on the issue contributing with the following conclusions: 
a.  The political institutions are important when determining economic growth if, 
and only if, the country does not have a consolidated democracy. This result clearly implies that 
political institutions work as substitute for democracy when under an authoritarian regime or 
when countries are experiencing new democracies;  
b.  The democratization process will have an economically favorable transition if 
political institutions are adequate. Such conclusion helps to explain the great heterogeneity of 
economic performance during post-democratization periods. It also shows that economic gains 
derived  from  democratization  can  be  good  even  in  the  short-run,  as  long  as  the  political 
institutions provide conditions that are able to reduce the momentary instability during the 
period of democratization; 
c.  Countries with high ethnic fractionalization, like some of the African countries, 
develop more in accordance with their political institutions. However, they develop differently 
from other countries, a fragmented control of power and the distribution of authority among 16 
 
states and districts are not beneficial for the national economic growth – such result is different 
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Table A.1: Description of Political variables 
 
Variable  Description  Symbol 
 
Chief Executive Variables: 
Political System  Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), Presidential (0)  SYSTEM 
Years of the Chief 
Executive in the 
Office 
Number of years of the chief executive has been in office 
YRSOFFC 
 
Party Variables in the Legislature: 
Government 
Fractionalization 
The probability that two deputies picked at random from among 









% of government seats in the congress  





The weighted average of the number of representatives elected by 
each constituency size 
MDMH  
Plurality System  In “plurality” systems, legislators are elected using a winner-take-
all / first past the post rule. “1” if this system is used, 0 if it isn’t. 
PLURALITY 
Closed Lists  Are closed lists used? (1 if yes, 0 if no)  CL 
 
Stability and Checks and Balances: 
Polarization  Maximum polarization between the executive party and the four 






Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or 




Are there state/province governments locally elected? 1 if yes, 0 if 
no. 
STATE 
 
 
 